Part of the Advanced Automation System (AAS) for air-traffic control is a protocol to permit flight hand-off from one air-traffic controller to another. The protocol must be fault-tolerant and, therefore, is subtle-an ideal candidate for the application of formal methods. This paper describes a formal method for deriving fault-tolerant protocols that is based on refinement and proof outlines. The AAS hand-off protocol was actually derived using this method; that derivation is given.
Introduction
The next-generation air traffic control system for the United States is currently being built under contract to the U.S. government by the IBM Federal Systems Company (recently acquired by Loral Corp.). Advanced Automation System (AAS) [1] is a large distributed system that must function correctly, even if hardware components fail.
Design errors in AAS software are avoided and eliminated by a host of methods. This paper discusses one of them-the formal derivation of a protocol from its specification-and how it was applied in the AAS protocol for transferring authority to control a flight from one air-traffic controller to another. The flight hand-off protocol we describe is the one actually used in the production AAS system (although the protocol there is programmed in Ada). And, the derivation we give is a description of how the protocol actually was first obtained.
The formal methods we use are not particularly esoteric nor sophisticated. The specification of the problem is simple, as is the characterization of hardware failures that it must tolerate. Because the hand-off protocol is short, computer-aided support was not necessary for the derivation. Deriving more complex protocols would certainly benefit from access to a theorem prover.
We proceed as follows. The next section gives a specification of the problem and the assumptions being made about the system. Section 1.2.3 describes the formal method we used. Finally, Section 1.2.4 contains our derivation of the hand-off protocol.
Specification and System Model
The air-traffic controller in charge of a flight at any time is determined by the location of the flight at that time. However, the hand-off of the flight from one controller to another is not automatic: some controller must issue a command requesting that the ownership of a flight be transferred from its current owner to a new controller. This message is sent to a process that is executing on behalf of the new controller. It is this process that starts the execution of the hand-off itself.
The hand-off protocol has the following requirements:
P1: No two controllers own the same flight at the same time.
P2: The interval during which no controller owns a flight is brief (approximately one second).
P3: A controller that does not own a flight knows which controller does own that flight.
The hand-off protocol is implemented on top of AAS system software that implements several strong properties about message delivery and execution time [1] . For our purposes, we simplify the system model somewhat and mention only those properties needed by our hand-off protocol.
The system is structured as a set of processes running on a collection of processors interconnected with redundant networks. The services provided by AAS system software include a point-to-point FIFO interprocess communication facility and a name service that allows for location-independent interprocess communication. AAS also supports the notion of a resilient process s comprising a primary process s.p and a backup process s.b. The primary sends messages to the backup so that the backup's state stays consistent with the primary. This allows the backup to take over if the primary fails.
A resilient process is used to implement the services needed by an air-traffic controller, including screen management, display of radar information, and processing of flight information. We denote the primary process for a controller C as C.p and its backup process as C.b. If C is the owner of a flight f , then C.p can execute commands and send messages that affect the status of flight f ; C.b, like all backup processes in AAS, only receives and records information from C.p in order to take over if C.p fails.
AAS implements a simple failure model for processes [3] : S1: Processes can fail by crashing. A crashed process simply stops executing without otherwise taking any erroneous action.
S2: If a primary process crashes, then its backup process detects this and begins executing a user-specified routine.
Property S2 is implemented by having a failure detector service. This service monitors each process and, upon detecting a failure, notifies any interested process.
If the hand-off protocol runs only for a brief interval of time, then it is safe to assume that no more than a single failure will occur during execution. So, we assume: S3: In any execution of the hand-off protocol, at most one of the participating processes can crash.
S4: Messages in transit can be lost if the sender or receiver of the message crashes. Otherwise, messages are reliably delivered, without corruption, and in a timely fashion. No spurious messages are generated.
We also can assume that messages are not lost due to failure of network components such as controllers and repeaters. This is a reasonable assumption because the processors of AAS are interconnected with redundant networks and it is assumed that no more than one of the networks will fail.
In any long-running system in which processes can fail, there must be a mechanism for restarting processes and reintegrating them into the system. We ignore such issues here because that functionality is provided by AAS system software. Instead, we assume that at the beginning of a hand-off from A to B, all four processes A.p, A.b, B.p, B.b are operational.
Fault-tolerance and Refinement
A protocol is a program that runs on a collection of one or more processors. We indicate that S is executed on processor p by writing:
Execution of (1.2.1) is the same as skip if p has failed and otherwise is the same as executing S as a single, indivisible action. This is exactly the behavior one would expect when trying to execute an atomic action S on a fail-stop processor. Sequential composition is indicated by juxtaposition. 
Proof Outlines
We use proof outlines to reason about execution of a protocol. A proof outline is a program that has been annotated with assertions, each of which is enclosed in braces. A precondition appears before each atomic action, and a postcondition appears after each atomic action. Assertions are Boolean formulas involving the program variables.
Here is an example of a proof outline.
In this example, x = 0 ∧ y = 0, x = 1 ∧ y = 0, and x = 1 ∧ y = 1 are assertions. Assertion x = 0 ∧ y = 0 is the precondition of X1, denoted pre(X1), and assertion x = 1 ∧ y = 0 is the postcondition of X1, denoted post(X2). The postcondition of X1 is also the precondition of X2.
A proof outline is valid if its assertions are an accurate characterization of the program state as execution proceeds. More precisely, a proof outline is valid if the proof outline invariant
is not invalidated by execution of the program, where at(S) is a predicate that is true when the program counter is at statement S, and after(S) is a predicate this is true when the program counter is just after statement S.
The proof outline above is valid. For example, execution starting in a state where
is true satisfies the proof outline invariant and, as execution proceeds, the invariant remains true. Notice, our definition of validity allows execution to begin anywhere-even in the middle of the program. Changing post(X1) (and pre(X2)) to x = 1 destroys the validity of the above proof outline. (Start execution in state x = 1 ∧ y = 23 ∧ after(X1). The proof outline invariant will hold initially but is invalidated by execution of X2.)
A simple set of (syntactic) rules can be used to derive valid proof outlines. The first such programming logic was proposed in [2] . The logic that we use is a variant of that one, extended for concurrent programs [4] .
Additional extensions are needed to derive a proof outline involving statements like (1.2.1). Here is a rule for (1.2.1); it uses the predicate up(p) to assert that processor p has not failed.
Action at Processor:
Since execution of S at p when p has crashed is equivalent to a skip, one might think that
should be valid if {A} S {B} is. Proof outline (1.2.4), however, is not valid. Consider an execution that starts in a state satisfying A and suppose p has not crashed. According to the rule's hypothesis, execution of S would produce a state satisfying B.
If process p then crashed, the state would satisfy ¬up(p) ∧ B. Unless B implies A, the postcondition of (1.2.4) no longer holds. The problem with (1.2.4) is that the proof outline invariant is invalidated by a processor failure. The predicate up(p) changing value from true to false causes the proof outline invariant to be falsified. We define a proof outline to be fault-invariant with respect to a class of failures if the proof outline invariant is not falsified by the occurrence of any allowable subset of those failures.
For the hand-off protocol, we are concerned with tolerating a single processor failure. We, therefore, are concerned with proof outlines whose proof outline invariants are not falsified when up(p) becomes false for a single processor (provided up(p) is initially true for all processors). Checking that a proof outline is fault-invariant for this class of failures is simple:
where L[x:= e] stands for L with every free occurrence of x replaced by e.
Derivation of the Hand-off Protocol
Let CTR(f ) be the set of controllers that own flight f . Property P1 can then be restated as
Desired is a protocol Xfer(A, B) satisfying
such that P1 ′ holds throughout the execution of Xfer(A, B). A simple implementation of this protocol would be to use a single variable ctr(f ) that contains the identity of the controller of flight f and to change ctr(f ) with an assignment statement:
This implementation is problematic because the variable ctr(f ) must reside at some site. Not only does this lead to a possible performance problem, but it makes determining the owner of f dependent on the availability of this site. Therefore, we represent CTR(f ) with a Boolean variable C.ctr(f ) at each site C, where
By doing so, we now require at least two separate actions in order to implement Xfer(A, B)-one action that changes A.ctr(f ) and one action that changes B.ctr(f ). Using the Action at Processor Rule, we get:
Note that pre(X2) must assert that CTR(f ) = ∅ holds, since otherwise execution of X2 invalidates P1 ′ . The preconditions of X1 and X2 are mutually inconsistent, so these statements cannot be executed in parallel. Moreover, X2 cannot be run first because pre(X2), CTR(f ) = ∅, does not hold in the initial state. Thus, X2 must execute after X1. Unfortunately, post(X1) does not imply pre(X2); if up(A) does not hold, then we cannot assert that CTR(f ) = ∅ is true. This should not be surprising: if A fails, then it cannot relinquish ownership.
One solution for this availability problem is to employ a resilient process. That is, each controller C will have a primary process C.p and a backup process C.b executed on processors that fail independently. Each process has its own copy of C.ctr(f ), and these copies will be used to represent C.ctr(f ) in a manner that tolerates a single processor failure:
Since we assume that there is at most one failure during execution of the protocol, the above definition never references the variable of a failed process. Replacing references to processor "A" in Statement X1 with "A.p" produces the following:
This proof outline is not fault-invariant, however. If A.p were to fail when the precondition holds, then the precondition might not continue to hold. In particular, if A ∈ CTR(f ) holds because A.p.ctr(f ) is true and A.b.ctr(f ) happens to be false, then when A.p fails, A ∈ CTR(f ) would not hold. We need to assert that A.p.ctr(f ) = A.b.ctr(f ) also holds whenever pre(X1a) does. We express this condition using the following definition:
Note that if one of A.p or A.b has failed then A.p.ctr(f ) and A.b.ctr(f ) need not be equal. Adding Pr to pre(X1a) gives the following proof outline, which is fault-invariant for a single failure:
We need more than just X1a to implement X1, however. X1a does not re-establish Pr, which must hold for subsequent ownership transfers. This suggests that A.b.ctr(f ) also be updated. Another problem with X1a is that post(X1a) still does not imply pre(X2): if up(A.p) does not hold, then CTR(f ) = ∅ need not hold.
An action whose postcondition implies
suffices. By our assumption, up(A.p) ∨ up(A.b) holds, so this postcondition and post(X1a) will together allow us to conclude CTR(f ) = ∅ holds, thereby establishing pre(X2). Here is an action that, when executed in a state satisfying pre(X1a), terminates with the above assertion holding:
One might think that since X1a and X1b have the same preconditions they could be run in parallel, and the design of the first half of the protocol would be complete. Unfortunately, we are not done yet. The original protocol specification implicitly restricted permissible ownership transitions. Written as a regular expression, the allowed sequence of states is:
That is, first A owns the flight, then no controller owns the flight for zero or more states, and finally B owns the flight. The proof outline above does not tell us anything about transitions; it only tells that P1 ′ holds throughout (because P1 ′ is implied by all assertions). We must strengthen the proof outline to deduce that only correct transitions occur.
A regular expression (like the one above) can be represented by a finite state machine that accepts all sentences described by the regular expression. Furthermore, a finite state machine is characterized by a next-state transition function. The following next-state transition function δ AB characterizes the finite state machine for (1.2.5):
The value of δ AB is the set of values of CTR(f ) that are next allowed for the protocol. For example, when CTR(f ) = ∅ holds, δ AB says that a transition to a state in which CTR(f ) = ∅ holds or to a state in which CTR(f ) = {B} holds are the only permissible transitions. Note that since P1 ′ holds, we know that the three cases A ∈ CTR(f ), CTR(f ) = ∅, B ∈ CTR(f ) are mutually exclusive, so δ AB always has a unique value.
We further define Θδ AB to be the value of δ AB in the previous state during the execution of the hand-off protocol, or {{A}, ∅, {B}} if there is no previous state. Our hand-off protocol only will make permissible state transitions provided each assertion implies that CTR(f ) ∈ Θδ AB ; that is, provided the current owner of f is one of the owners that was acceptable as the "next owner" in the previous state of the system.
We therefore add conjunct CTR(f ) ∈ Θδ AB to the assertions in the proof outline and check to see if the stronger proof outline is valid. If it is valid, then we can move on to implementing X2, the second part of Xfer (A, B) ; otherwise, we will have reason to make further modifications.
Here is the (strengthened) proof outline with X1a and X1b running in parallel:
Unfortunately, this proof outline is not fault-invariant. If A.p fails in a state satisfying after(X1a) ∧ at(X1b) then the following holds before the failure:
After the failure, we have:
So, CTR(f ) ∈ Θδ AB does not hold after the failure, and the first conjunct of post (X1a) is invalidated. One simple solution is to preclude states where at(X1b) ∧ after(X1a)
holds. This can be done by running the two actions in sequence-first X1b and then X1a. The result is described by the following proof outline:
What we really want to conclude in post(X1a), however, is CTR(f ) = ∅-not just A ∈ CTR(f ). This is easily done by strengthening the above proof outline with the following:
′ holds. It is not invalidated by any assignment, because the only variables assigned to are those of A.p and A.b. So, POnly(A) remains true throughout the execution of X1.
The derivation of a protocol for X2 is basically the same, except that A is replaced by B and false is interchanged by true. Doing so results in the proof outline shown in Figure 1 .2.1.
Implementing P3
Property P3 of Section 1.2.2 is satisfied by the protocol in Figure 1 .2.1 as long as there are exactly two controllers. When there are more than two controllers, a controller must query other controllers in order to determine which owns a flight. Doing so is inefficient, so we instead consider having each controller C maintain a variable C.ctrID(f ) that names the owner of flight f . As with C.ctr(f ), we represent the value of C.ctrID(f ) in a manner that tolerates a single site failure:
This variable can be used to implement the Boolean C.ctr(f ) by defining:
Thus, the assignment "C.ctr(f ) := true" would be replaced by "C.ctrID(f ) := C", and "C.ctr(f ) := false" would be replaced by "C.ctrID(f ) := X" for any value X = C. We can rewrite P3 as the following:
according to the definitions of CTR(f ),
A.ctr(f ), and POnly(B) ′ . Thus, Z(A, B) would have to be started no earlier than after(X1a) and terminate by at(X2a). Unfortunately, Z(A, B) may take a significant amount of time-even though its component statements can be executed in parallel, the time to execute Z(A, B) will include some communication and synchronization overhead. This extra time could make satisfying P2 hard or impossible.
Property P3 ′ is perhaps a bit too strong. In fact, all that is really required is that a controller be able to communicate with the process that owns a flight. For example, C.ctrID(f ) could be the start of a path of controllers, terminating with the current owner. The scheme where C.ctrID(f ) indicates the current owner is equivalent to requiring that this path have a length of 1. But, longer paths are also acceptable.
Let C C ′ denote that C.ctrID(f ) = C ′ , and let C * C ′ denote the transitive closure of . Using this notation, P3
′ can be expressed as:
We weaken P3 ′ as follows:
P3
′′ is left invariant by the protocol in Figure 1 
Implementation using Messages
So far, the protocol we have derived consists of assignment statements to various variables that reside on separate processes. The protocol consists of the three processes, as follows: An actual implementation would require that each assignment statement be executed by the processor whose variable is being set. Furthermore, the assignment statements of the first process must be sequenced. This sequencing will be accomplished in our implementation by processor B.p, since this processor starts the protocol. If B.p crashes, then B.b will take over the sequencing. Because all assignments are constants to variables, when taking over, B.b can simply start at the beginning of the sequence-it not need to know how far B.p got before failing.
B.b does need to know when B.p has finished executing the hand-off protocol. Otherwise, a crash of B.p might cause B.b to re-execute the hand-off from A to B after f has been later handed off to another controller, in which case B.b would undo that later hand-off. Hence, B.b must be notified of the completion of the hand-off before any subsequent hand-offs are started. We represent the fact that a hand-off from A to B is in progress with a variable B.b.xfr, whose value is initially ⊥.
In order to continue the implementation using messages, some further details of the AAS system services must be given.
• Communication between resilient processes uses send and receive. If some process sends a message m to a resilient process C, then m is enqueued at C.p if C.p has not crashed and enqueued at C.b if C.p has crashed. Furthermore, send does not return control until the message has been enqueued at the remote process. The remote process may crash after enqueueing m but before delivering m, in which case m is lost.
• The primary of a resilient process communicates with its backup using log. Like send, log does not return control until the message is enqueued by the remote process. A log that is executed when there is no backup (for example, when the backup has crashed or when log is executed by the backup itself) does nothing and immediately returns control.
• Until the primary of a resilient process crashes, the backup delivers only messages sent by log.
• When primary C.p crashes, C.b takes over by first processing any enqueued messages sent by C.p using log. It then executes the user-defined recovery protocol. And, finally, it receives messages sent to C.
We also use a variable in each process to represent the value of variables C.p.ctrID(f ) and C.b.ctrID(f ). A simple approach would be to introduce C.p.owner(f ) and C.b.owner(f ), such that: A more efficient hand-off protocol can be implemented using the following definitions of C.p.ctrID(f ) and C.b.ctrID(f ). Let the predicate E C (f, X) mean that C.b has enqueued but not yet processed a log from C.p that requests the execution of C.b.owner(f ):= X, and let V C (f ) be the value of X in the most recent such log message. Then, we define: 
